Pluralism, liberalism, and distributive justice Crowder, George Errol 2012-06-14T05:55:10Z 2012-06-14T05:55:10Z 2009
dc.description.abstract It is argued that a liberal reading of the Berlinian concept of value pluralism suggests an egalitarian rather than a laissez-faire approach to distributive justice. Within egalitarianism the debate between welfare, resource, and capabilities theories is more finely balanced. Pluralists will be unhappy with subjective versions of the welfare view, but some objective versions may be compatible with pluralism. The resource paradigm may seem too narrow at first sight, but in Dworkin's hands it can be made to cover many of the cases that would concern pluralists. On the whole, though, the author is inclined to believe that it is the capabilities model that meets pluralist requirements most fully, for the reasons that emerged in the last section. Pluralists should accept that, just as the human good is plural, so too is morally relevant disadvantage. en
dc.identifier.citation Crowder, G.E., 2009. Pluralism, liberalism, and distributive justice. San Diego Law Review, 46(4), 773-802. en
dc.identifier.issn 0036-4037
dc.identifier.rmid 2006014178
dc.language.iso en
dc.oaire.license.condition.license In Copyright
dc.publisher University of San Diego School of Law en
dc.subject Law en
dc.subject Egalitarianism en
dc.subject Justice en
dc.subject Welfare en
dc.title Pluralism, liberalism, and distributive justice en
dc.type Article en
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