Marx and Aristotle on the Highest Good Hunt, Ian Edgell 2010-03-24T01:02:03Z 2010-03-24T01:02:03Z 2009
dc.description.abstract Aristotle claims that the most perfect happiness is a life of contemplation, which is a life as close to the supremely happy lives of the Gods as is possible in human life. This life is more perfectly happy because contemplation, in taking itself as its own object, cannot so easily be deprived of what is necessary for it and thus remains less subject to misfortune. I shall argue that, while there are many affinities between Marx’s conception of the highest good and this conception from Aristotle, Marx differs crucially by taking the highest good to be human rather than godlike. For Marx, the counterpart of being removed from the vicissitudes of fortune is the reduction to a minimum of what he terms the sphere of necessity. The highest good is not a life of contemplation but rather the pursuit of ends that human beings individually and collectively choose for themselves independently of the demands of survival and reproduction. en
dc.identifier.citation Hunt, Ian 2009. Marx and Aristotle on the Highest Good. In E. Close, G. Couvalis, G. Frazis, M. Palaktsoglou, and M. Tsianikas (eds.) "Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2007", Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 97-108. en
dc.identifier.isbn 978-0725811341
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek en
dc.subject Greek Research en
dc.subject Greece en
dc.subject Australia en
dc.subject Ian Hunt en
dc.title Marx and Aristotle on the Highest Good en
dc.type Article en
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
575.52 KB
Adobe Portable Document Format
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
2.45 KB
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission